Podcast - November 7, 2023

Episode 87: The Performance Episode

In this episode of the Bare Naked Money Podcast, the hosts discuss investment performance. They talk about the challenges and opportunities in the current market, including high valuations and the attractiveness of bonds. They also share their experiences with specific investment decisions, such as buying Shopify and the frustrations of investing in high-growth stocks. The hosts emphasize the importance of having a balanced and patient approach to investing. They also mention upcoming content on performance and index investing.

Episode Transcript

Transcript is automatically generated

Announcer (00:00):

You are about to get lucky with the Bare Naked Money Podcast, the show that gives you the naked truth about personal finance with your hosts, Josh Sheek and Colin White Portfolio Managers with Rakin Capital Management Inc.

Colin White (00:31):

Josh and Colin with you coming at you with the next episode of Bare Naked Money and we’re going to talk about performance generous pause for giggling and laughter amongst the infantile members of our audience. We are going to talk about investment performance just to set the table a little bit better. So I am going to hit Josh with all of the hard hitting questions I can think of about investment performance and get his learner opinion. Now, full disclosure, he has provided some questions in advance that I’m sure he’s got great answers for, but I’m not going to stick entirely to that list, so I just want to keep Josh on his toes. Are you ready, Josh?

Josh Sheluk (01:15):

I’m not only ready, I’m excited. Colin, we got to get into this. We got to do a debrief for a couple years worth of performance. So hit me what you got.

Colin White (01:24):

Well, yeah, well context, I guess performance is one of those things that you can’t concentrate on too much because it can lead you down some bunny holes, but it is important to talk about and to understand. So your first program question, and you know what, I’m going to actually provide a disclaimer for the questions you provided so that the audience knows that these are ones you should have really good answers for. So the first is give us a skinny on results over the last one to two years.

Josh Sheluk (01:52):

Alright, well thanks for that, Colin. You’re already stealing my thunder, which is awesome. That’s what a good co-host does, I believe so appreciate that. So yeah, so I think the last couple of years have been pretty interesting. So just at a very high level, I’d say on an absolute basis. So if you look at how results have actually gone, they’ve been, I’d say modestly disappointed for most people. If you looked at your account probably 18 months ago and you look at your account today, you’re probably flat-ish, maybe down a little bit. And anytime you’re seeing that over an extended period of time, you’re going to be disappointed. It’s just the natural human reaction. Now on a relative basis, what we’ve been able to do I think has been quite positive, especially on the bond side. Now for our clients, they say, well I don’t really build my retirement on your relative results and that would be totally fair, but in the short term, we’re quite honest and candid with people.

(02:52):

We don’t have a crystal ball. We don’t know where the market is going from one month or one year to the next necessarily. So we do our best to nudge things in the right direction, but we’re not going to end up in a hundred percent cash position for our clients when the market’s going down just because that period of time is unpredictable and that’s not going to lead you to sustainable consistent results over time. Modestly disappointing over the last year and a half to two years. But from our perspective where we sit and how we evaluate ourselves relative to the markets so to speak, we feel that we’ve done a pretty good job.

Colin White (03:31):

Well, I think this is where you can jump in as we can introduce the term of endpoint bias. Would this be a good time to throw that in? Because again, we’ve done some work here recently on the last 12 months, and if you take a look at the 12 month number, that is a number that would make people happy and excited. So just by changing the period that you look at by not a lot, you could fairly dramatically change the conversation that you’re having regarding absolute performance in relative performance as well. So endpoint bias is indeed a thing.

Josh Sheluk (04:03):

Yeah, the last five years are a great example of that endpoint bias. If you go back one year, things look awesome. If you go back two years, not so great, if you go back three years, things look awesome. If you go back five years not so great, and that’s because there’s been three 20% declines in the last five years in stock markets. So if you capture all three of those periods in the period of time that you’re looking at, you’re going to draw some pretty different conclusions depending if you measure from the start or the finish of that 20% decline. So yes, even when you think a five-year period is a very long period of time, yes and no. Yes and no. It feels like a long time. It feels like you should be able to get good results over every five-year period of time. But again, depending on how you measure it, you make it a lot of different results depending on which months you choose.

Colin White (04:58):

Well, on average a five-year period, it’s a relatively good period to look at. You increase your opportunities to have positive outcomes, the longer

Josh Sheluk (05:05):

Your

Colin White (05:06):

Time horizon is. So it’s just, but sometimes if there’s a 10% chance of rain, it may rain. So there are the outliers that do happen for sure, and this is where the expression really describes this very well, not having a crystal ball. We build boats, we don’t predict the weather. That’s the best way to look at an investment approach. If it’s based on an accurate weather forecast, you’re going to get horribly disappointed on a semi-regular basis. One in a million events happen every couple of years, according to my memory anyway. So if you concentrate just on building a good boat, a good portfolio that can ride out, no matter what kind of storm hits, that’s where you’re going to make some progress.

Josh Sheluk (05:53):

And for the record, if you’ve been patient over the last five years, you’ve done well, you just maybe not quite as well as you would’ve hoped.

Colin White (06:00):

So it’s all about managing expectations then, is it?

Josh Sheluk (06:02):

Well, to some extent. I mean, expectations matter and you need to have realistic expectations of not only what your results are going to be over the long term, but over the short term as well. So I think it’s really important to stay grounded and not have unrealistic expectations as you alluded to at the outset, that can lead you down some paths that are not going to be successful for you over time.

Colin White (06:30):

Alright, let’s say, so the next planted question, what’s the biggest call that we’ve gotten? Right in the recent past? I went just to see which one you pick.

Josh Sheluk (06:40):

Yeah, so to me the most, when I say biggest, it’s not like it was the most dramatic or outlandish call, but I think the one that’s added the most value for our clients, and that’s been underweight on the bond side of the portfolio, so less exposure to bonds and less exposure to interest rate sensitivity. So interest rates go up, bonds go down in value. We had, I’d say a pretty damn good positioning for that outlook call it two years ago, and that really helped the fixed income, the bond part of our portfolio do again on a relative basis very well on an absolute basis still down a little bit over time. So I think that it might, again, it’s an obvious one in hindsight and maybe even at the time it was fairly obvious. You looked at interest rates at one to 2% and said, well, this isn’t compelling at all, but I think that has been the most meaningful, I guess over the last couple of years.

Colin White (07:43):

Well, and it really was at an extreme because not only were we taking a look at where the relative pressures were on interest rates at the time and what we figured those pressures were going to indicate over time, it was on an absolute basis. It just didn’t make sense. I mean, you’re sitting and the bonds are yielding six, 7%, then okay, now you’re more firmly in the realm of what makes sense from a tactical perspective or what makes sense from a pressure perspective. Where are the pressures leading interest rates now? Because if the answer is, well, we just should stay in the fixed income, that’s not a bad, you’re parking money at a reasonable rate, you have a reasonable expected rate of return, it’s a little bit tougher when you get down into that one 2% range to say that that’s a reasonable allocation and it caused a lot of people to go way off reservation. When it came to alternatives to that, you’ve had people using balanced global funds as an fixed income equivalent and all kinds of other products getting launched that looked like bonds, tasted like bonds, but really weren’t bonds because there was such a heavy motivation to get away from that reality of those low interest rates. Here’s an off the cuff question. What was your favorite example of somebody trying to come up with a fixed income quotes equivalent that really wasn’t fixed income at all?

Josh Sheluk (09:02):

Well, there’s a lot of them, but so there are these short volatility products and there’s a lot of intricacies and nuances and complexities around these, but there were ETFs that were basically collecting income on a regular basis as long as volatility was relatively muted. And if you look at the chart for these things, it’s like a steady line up into the right, which is exactly what you want from an investment until it wasn’t and they basically went to zero overnight. So I don’t think there were a whole lot of people out there claiming that these were totally fixed income alternatives, but I do know that there’s definitely a few out there that were saying, look at the steady stream. How could you go wrong with something like this? So that for me is probably most obvious. How about you?

Colin White (10:06):

Well, I’m just curious if you’re looking at the same one. Was that the one that was based on the vix?

Josh Sheluk (10:10):

Yeah, yeah, that’s right.

Colin White (10:12):

Yeah, that was the one where the guy who created that indicator said, what are you doing? It wasn’t designed as an investment products.

Josh Sheluk (10:18):

Yeah, well

Colin White (10:19):

My favorite was watching, and I’ve sat in chairs where we’ve been evaluating portfolios from different sources and stuff and people literally, I swear to goodness, we’re putting forward balanced global funds as a fixed income equivalent because they did the math and they could get the standard deviation low enough that they figured that’s all that mattered and they were trying to put that in as a bond substitute, which crosses a whole bunch of streams and has a whole bunch of, it’s one of those ones, you’re right, Josh, it works right up until it doesn’t. So if you’re in a really abnormal period and you backtest something or you create something that works in that really abnormal period, as soon as you exit the abnormal period and sunlight hits it, a good chance, it’s going to completely evaporate because if it didn’t exist before the abnormal period, it was created during an abnormal period relies on an abnormal period to exist. So it’s not likely to survive the transition.

Josh Sheluk (11:17):

Yeah, one of the most prevalent ones I think is just buying a dividend paying stocks as a substitute for bonds, and anytime you’re using anything stock related as a substitute for bonds, I think you’re going down the wrong path. I’d say that with pretty high conviction, yeah, you can get a 4% dividend yield or 5% dividend yield on a portfolio dividend paying stocks, which is awesome until it goes down 40% and you need to draw that money, which I’m not predicting that this is going to happen this year or anything, but it probably will happen over the course of time. And if your money that you need to be safe and stabilize your portfolio and stabilize your investment portfolio is in something that can go down 30 or 40% virtually overnight, then I think you’re going down a dangerous path. Dangerous path.

Colin White (12:12):

Yeah, no, absolutely. I mean at the end of the day, it matters how much money’s in your account and how quickly your account’s growing. You should be agnostic to how it gets there and to overweight, one aspect of things in the form of dividends, a lot of people do it, which actually leads to some mispricing in the market, but artificially adds some fragility to your account that doesn’t need to be there, it just doesn’t. I’m going to go in a limb and try to pull something out of my memory. Who was the dividend cuts that we’ve seen fairly recently that caused a stir in the Canadian dividend paying space? Was that Algonquin?

Josh Sheluk (12:48):

Well, yeah, I mean that

Colin White (12:49):

Was a while back.

Josh Sheluk (12:50):

We have Algonquin in our portfolio today, but we didn’t have it in the portfolio back before the dividend cuts, but utility company, utility business that you think pretty solid, pretty stable. It’s a two thirds of its businesses regulated, so you’d think that it would be pretty good. But yeah, it’s material dividend cuts, I think over 50% from top to bottom. So these dividends are not guaranteed. There are definitely some pockets of the Canadian market that have a good long-term track record of paying sustainable dividends. But I was looking at a list of some of the companies that you would call at one point. I think good sustainable, long-term businesses that stopped paying dividends or cut significantly. It’d be pretty surprising, like Manulife back in, I guess it was oh eight, that it really crashed, but it’s never recovered to its previous highs and its dividend is substantially lower than it was even back then after 15 years here. So there are massive companies that have been very successful over time, paying consistent dividends that have had to cut for one reason or another,

Colin White (13:59):

And sometimes they’re cutting for very good reasons. Sometimes cutting is the right thing to do because again, a dividend is paying out of capital. Now if a company can reinvest or use that capital and earn a return for shareholders, they should be incentivized to do that. So it’s not that cutting dividends is always a terrible thing. Sometimes it’s the right decision that management needs to make. So it’s too easy to talk with dividends because people think back to the days when they got a share certificate in paper and there’s dividend coupons and this whole thing around dividends are always paid and all the rest of it, but it’s basically folklore at this point. There’s more mistakes made and more, in my opinion, more mispricing or overpricing or pricing for perfection in the high dividend paying stocks than you find in the rest of the market because again, it still has this allure to it.

(14:47):

This is why you still see products that are completely based on it. You see the word dividend. Ooh, that must be a good investment. Yeah, it might be. We’re not saying dividends are bad just to be clear, but it might not be two. Josh, I’m only going to give you one in this next category because I know you have more than one, but I’m only going to give you one. What decision do you wish you could have back or what decision do you wish you could have made? Maybe I’ll give you two. One non-decision and one decision one time you didn’t make a decision that you should have and one time that you wanted to take it back.

Josh Sheluk (15:22):

And I’m just talking and thinking recently here, so I guess we’ll go with the decision. And the one maybe biggest thorn in our side in the portfolio up to now on an individual stock basis has been Haynes Brands, which it’s your traditional socks and underwear company. Seems like a pretty steady idea there. And when we purchased it we thought, hey, there’s upside here. The business is getting right size, they’re working through some of their issues specifically in their international cohort and it should be, like I said, a fairly steady Eddy type of brand and business and it’s got into a little bit of issue with debt and inventory and that kind of spiraled a little bit over a couple year period of time. And with the stocks down materially from where we bought it, I don’t know exactly where it is as of today, but something like 60% wouldn’t be out of the question.

(16:20):

So that’s been a tough one. Now with individual stocks, we always have a very constrained allocation or weight to them, so we know we’re going to make mistakes from time to time and this is one that looks like we bought it at the wrong time for the record, we still own it today and you still think that there’s upside there, but it’s definitely been a big frustration over the last couple of years and topic of much conversation along the way. So that’s probably the one decision that was maybe that the timing just wasn’t right on it. Biggest non-decision over the recent couple of years. I don’t know if there’s a big one that I would say that we really missed the boat on that, but I’ll kick it back to you. Is there one that comes to mind for you that you think we should have done that and didn’t at the time and now we’re kicking ourselves for it?

Colin White (17:17):

Well, I don’t think we’re kicking ourselves for anything. Again, I have a bit of a different philosophical bent on these things. A decision is right or wrong based on the information available time the decision was made. So

(17:28):

To go back and say we didn’t look at that information correctly, I can’t give you an example of that. I think there’s been some times when we’re patient, so we tend to wait to see things develop before we move and that’s very prudent. But there’s part of me that’s frustrated said, well, if we jumped a little quicker, we could have been a little bit further ahead of things we ended up being right and just maybe a little bit slower to act. But I think that that’s a good thing there. I’m not going to hold it out as a true mistake or regret, it’s just one of those emotional things that I need to keep in check because impatience can cause a lot of damage and slow and steady does win the race. That adage is very, very, but no, I think that the decision making at a moment in time for me, it’s based on that information. Now things can move against you. Like the Hans brands, things moved against us, but I don’t think that there may have been a lack of consideration pay to the burgeoning inventory and debt issues, but maybe there was nothing available at that time.

Josh Sheluk (18:31):

Well, I think that would be the one, and I say this to our investment team all the time, it’s like the times that I’ve got burned on stocks is a debt issue. It always is. It feels like that way to me it’s always a debt issue. So perhaps we should have taken a more constrained position because the debt was elevated at the time, and that’s one where I can look back and say, yeah, maybe we should have done that a little bit differently. I’m also viewing, so when you asked about what was a non-decision, I’m also viewing this from the context of our approach in our observations in our portfolio construction methodology. I could easily say, well, we should have bought Nvidia on January 1st because it’s up 300%. But I mean that’s just one of those things where hindsight is truly 2020 and I could pick off probably five stocks that would’ve done incredibly well over the last six months, but it’s just not something that we’re going to look at based off of how those companies were valued and things like that.

Colin White (19:28):

Oh no, absolutely. What was the toughest decision that we made that you’re happy we did make?

Josh Sheluk (19:36):

So I’ll go back to an individual. You know what, I’ll give you two for this one. Can I get two for this one call

Colin White (19:43):

A second. I want to check with the judges. Judges are in favor.

Josh Sheluk (19:46):

Okay, I’ll give you a micro decision and I’ll give a macro decision. So on the micro side of things, I’ll go to an individual stock as well. And so here’s another interesting one. So we bought Shopify. We bought Shopify after it had got kicked in the stomach probably like five times and it had dropped, I don’t know when we bought it, 80% from its peak. And it had to be clear, it had gone up way, way, way beyond what it should have gone to. And then it came back down to what we thought was maybe a little bit lower than it should have come down to. So we bought Shopify and it proceeded to drop about 50% from where we bought it. That is tough when that happens when you buy something, you bought it at the right price, you did it for all the right reasons and it drops 50% and then you think, well again, you retrace, you’re all your steps and thing. I could have done this different, I could have done that timing, different, whatever. But we looked at it again, we said we don’t think anything has fundamentally changed with our beliefs of where it should go. So we averaged down and I think we about doubled our position maybe a little bit more at a half of what we initially bought at.

Colin White (20:58):

Just to interject everybody, that means we bought more,

Josh Sheluk (21:01):

We bought more, we bought, went down, went down by half and we bought more. And those are and will I think always be the hardest decisions because you’re looking at all the market-based evidence that is telling you that you’re wrong and you’re saying the math that I’m doing on the other side here that is more objective than the market tells me that I’m right. And the timing on that one was almost perfect. It had double, it’s retraced it back a bit since then and now it’s to a point where that’s probably the biggest grower percentage wise from our portfolio over the last 12 months. So that was a really hard decision at the time, but it’s paid off incredibly well.

Colin White (21:56):

The arrogance of your kid, I know something to the rest of the market.

Josh Sheluk (22:02):

When you’re buying a stock, that’s what you’re doing. That’s what you’re telling yourself. And like I said, we always take small positions with these individual stocks because we know that we’re going to be wrong sometimes. So you have to have confidence I think to be able to do that, but not arrogance because the arrogance is going to get you into stupid things where you’re buying 5% in individual stock at its peak and then next thing you know you’re blowing up your results for the next two years. So there needs to be a balance of confidence and humility, if that makes any sense.

Colin White (22:42):

Oh no, absolutely. It’s confidence without arrogance. That’s the way I always describe it. You have to have the confidence act because again, if you don’t have enough confidence to act, you just sit there and a bystander and watch stuff go by. To my earlier question, there are times where you kind of sit and watch stuff happen, you go, I should have made a decision there. Not making a decision is to fact a decision, right? Sure.

Josh Sheluk (23:04):

So just on the macro side, I’ll just cover it quickly. So again, all the evidence last year was telling us that the stock market was going to be weak for a long time. It had gone down, depending on the market, 10 to 20% that you’re looking at. And we said, you know what? It’s probably a little bit overdone here. We don’t feel that this is the right time to get out of stocks. So this is going back to mid 22 and we held to an overweight stock position all the way through early 23. And that was a successful decision for us because stocks have come back quite strongly since then. Not withstanding our positioning today, I think that was the right thing to do.

Colin White (23:45):

Well, I think our position today ignore it. Well underweighting the magnificent seven that have caught all of the headlines. I think that was an actual bit of a studied call on our part to kind of be out that far off step with everything else. And I think that our relative performance given that is also a pretty positive story that someday we should really dig into and completely understand how we did that. But it’s pretty comfortable that you can avoid some of the risks that’s in the market and still be able to keep up on a performance basis

Josh Sheluk (24:18):

And our view. But that to me is one of these are really frustrating periods of time in 2023 or they can be anyway, where there’s a very small segment of the market that’s really driving things and driving performance numbers. And a lot of people will look at you and say, well, why don’t you own this? Why don’t you own marijuana? Why don’t you own Bitcoin? Why don’t you own the NASDAQ during 2020 and 2021? And when we look at it, we’re trying to value businesses, we’re trying to put a value on what we’re buying and if we can’t have it make sense, then we’re going to shy away from that. And the frustration is that it takes a long time sometimes and more patience than you want for the market to realize what you think is the right approach.

Colin White (25:12):

Well you’ve obviously I think answered the next question, which is your biggest frustration?

Josh Sheluk (25:17):

Well, yeah, and I guess that would probably be it. You see Nvidia, for example, and it literally is up like 300% this year and it was worth hundreds of billions of dollars before it’s tripled or quadrupled in value this year, which is kind of crazy to think about have they just created a trillion dollars in value for this company this year? It almost seems like that based off what people are paying for it. And you look at it and you kind of do the math and you’re like, okay, so they have to grow revenues by X percentage over how long of a period of time and how likely is that? And you say, well, it’s just not likely. Is it possible? Sure, anything’s possible. It’s just not likely. And I dunno, sometimes it just takes a long time for that for you either to be proof right or wrong on that it takes a long time and it’s painful in the process either way.

Colin White (26:11):

Well, yeah, again, it was like the example, it was given to me one time where Amazon was trading at a level that if it was going to basically have the same multiple that the Walmart did, it would’ve to have 100% market share on two earth-sized planets in order for them to justify their current stock price. Now that’s a bit tongue in cheek and you can parse that all kinds of ways as to not being fair, but it’s also not entirely unfair. We start pricing these things at a level that there’s no way they could get to and it becomes purely speculative at that point. It ceases being there are those that will put together a very seemingly reasoned argument about the value of data and the ancillary businesses that influences and all the rest of it. But at a certain point, if you have all the money, that’s probably not likely. And at a certain point, that’s where the math gets, right?

Josh Sheluk (27:01):

Yeah. Well there’s another one for Amazon, and I am going to mess up the numbers, so apologies for that. But there’s a guy named Michael Mobin who’s pretty well respected in the sort of strategy and research community. He said it was something like if you looked at companies that were worth a hundred billion dollars, which Amazon was one of them at the time, for Amazon to justify its valuation at that time, it would’ve had to grow revenues by double digit percentages over a 10 or 20 year period of time every year. And he said, well, how many companies that were that large had done that before? And the answer is zero. So it doesn’t mean it’s impossible. And the fact that Amazon probably has actually done that or is on track to do that, doesn’t detract from the idea that it would’ve been somewhat foolish to bet on that at the time.

Colin White (28:00):

Well, that’s where it comes down to portfolio construction and the secret to success is not getting one thing right? It’s not getting it all wrong. So to have a small weight in Amazon, that probably is warranted to make it 40% of your portfolio. No, just take 50% off their big shooter, that’s not your thing. Alright, so the capstone question. We need the lay of the land, not a forecast, but what opportunities and challenges do you see right now?

Josh Sheluk (28:35):

So I think the challenge is going to be things are lining up that are not, I’d say entirely positive for stocks over the next little while, however long that’s going to be. Valuations are pretty high. Economics look to be a little bit stretched, interest rates are putting a little bit of pressure on things. So that could potentially be, there could potentially be a little bit of a downturn for the stock market over, I’m going to say the next two years because I just don’t know exactly when it could be. But it seems like that’s a reasonable timeframe and if that happens, then you’re going to be potentially in for the third noticeable downturn in stocks, or sorry, fourth in the last six to seven years that starts to wear on people’s patients as investors. So I think that’s what I’m kind of concerned about as a challenge.

(29:32):

And not to say that things are going to be like a catastrophe or anything like that, but when you start looking at longer, again, you draw that line, that timeframe, however you want to draw it and start to look at, well, since 2018 I’ve only grown 2% per year. Well yeah, that’s going to be a tough thing to get past, but we go through periods like that all the time. We always have over history where you draw lines between specific periods and you see kind of flattish for a period of time and then guess what happens after that? You continue to get really good growth as well. Stocks will continue to grow over time. It’s just sometimes painful in the short term. So that’s to me a very big challenge on the opportunity side. Interest rates are as high as they’ve been in 15 years, 20 years.

(30:18):

Bonds are actually looking pretty damn attractive now, and that should give a pretty good cushion to portfolios that are a little bit more bond heavy. That doesn’t help me being 34 and having probably 50 years to invest and being mostly stock focused with my portfolio. But it does help the more conservative investor out there that has a bigger allocation to bonds and cash-like investments in their portfolio, actually getting some decently positive returns and not only positive returns, but I think after inflation you’ll see positive real returns going forward as well, which is really nice because we haven’t had that for a long time on the bond side.

Colin White (31:00):

Well, yeah, and that’s the nuanced answer. I mean the more apocryphal, it’s like, oh my God, it’s all coming to an end. Watch carefully as climate change is going to wreck your portfolio and those stories that are being told right now, I think the completely reasoned response is, yeah, it’s looking a little negative towards equities for the first little bit we think maybe. But what I keep talking about is now that the central banks have their gun loaded again, there is the potential for intervention on the other side to make things more positive again. So that now is because for the last call it 10 years that hasn’t been really in the closet, that hasn’t been something that we could point to say if things start to go materially in the wrong way and we don’t like it, there’s a relatively direct path to giving things a good nudge.

(31:52):

So I think that’s the piece that is truly unknowable because from a policy perspective, I think it’s going to be interesting to watch whether the central banks stay relatively in lockstep because I think we’re seeing a little bit of divergence now in situations of some of the major economies. So you may see a divergence on central bank, which causes stress on the system, and then it gets really unknowable. Like we hit the example of the Japanese announcement rattling bond yields globally. There’s all these interest adjustment interest rate announcements being made, markets didn’t move, Japan changes a policy on the range that they’re going to allow interest rates to fluctuate in and everybody’s yield curve moved.

Josh Sheluk (32:35):

So

Colin White (32:36):

Now you have this decoupling internationally. That’s the part that’s really unknowable. I think that’s the part that’s going to keep us having something to talk about every Thursday and Friday.

Josh Sheluk (32:45):

You got it. You got it.

Colin White (32:46):

So Josh, have we covered off everything you wanted to talk about investment performance?

Josh Sheluk (32:50):

I think so, yeah. Any last questions from you?

Colin White (32:54):

No, I think we’ve covered it pretty well. Stay tuned. I’m working on some stuff and we’re working on some stuff to talk about performance and answer some of the routine questions we get from prospects or even clients from time to time about how indexes work and all that kind of stuff. So we’re going to put out some collateral on that stuff so that people have some stuff to look at. I mean, the honest answer at the end of the day is performance at any period of time, we’re going to look really stupid some days and really smart other days. And every investment theory or every investment approach that you can think of is going to look really smart and really stupid depending on when you look at it. So it’s just a matter of understanding through a cycle how effective something is, and that’s the variables. There are a lot of them, and so it bears a little bit of attention. We’ll try to give you some content to help along with that.

Josh Sheluk (33:44):

Thanks for your great questions, Colin.

Colin White (33:46):

Thanks for writing them. Josh.

Announcer (33:48):

If you’re breaking a sweat trying to figure out what your financial advisor’s talking about, you’re not getting the service you need. You probably hate trying to get an answer from them, but you also think moving your accounts will be a headache and it might be, but working with don’t rock the boat. Wealth planning.com or AU isn’t exactly stress free, is it? Call us. We will demystify the world for you.

Announcer (34:16):

Vean Capital Management Inc. Is a registered portfolio manager in all of Canada except Manitoba. So sorry, Manitoba. Nothing in this podcast should be considered as a solicitation or recommendation to buy or sell a particular security statements made by the portfolio. Managers are intended to illustrate their approach and are meant for information and entertainment purposes only. They should not be construed as legal, tax or accounting advice. This podcast has been prepared for information purposes only. The tax information provided in this podcast is general in nature, and each client should consult with their own tax advisor, accountant, and lawyer before pursuing any strategy described. As each client’s individual circumstances are unique. We’ve endeavored to ensure the accuracy of the information provided that the time that it was written. However, should the information in this podcast be incorrect or incomplete, or should the law or its interpretation change after the date of this document, the advice provided may be incorrect or inappropriate. There should be no expectation that the information will be updated, supplemented, or revised, whether as a result of new information, changing circumstances, future events or otherwise. If you’re not responsible for errors contained in this podcast or to anyone who relies on the information contained in this podcast, please consult your own legal and tax advisor.